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THE RHODESIAN ECONOMY UNDER SANCTIONS1
A. M. HAWKINS
Economic sanctions against Rhodesia have failed. Not only have they 
failed to achieve their political objective of bringing about the collapse of the 
existing Government, but they have also failed to depress economic activity 
to the extent that was intended. After 12 months of voluntary sanctions 
followed by eight months of mandatory United Nations sanctions there are 
signs that the economy—far from wilting under the pressure—is beginning to 
grow once again. It would appear that the worst is past.
I. The Background to Sanctions: Stagnation and Growth 1961 to 1965.
The period of Federation from 1953 to 1963 was marked by the impres­
sive, if uneven, growth of the Rhodesian economy. During this period the real 
growth rate of gross national income (measured at constant 1954 prices) 
fluctuated considerably from year to year, reaching a high of just over 10 
percent in 1956 and a low in 1962 when the real GNI actually declined.
It was anticipated that the dissolution of the Federation at the end of 
1963 would mean considerable economic hardship for Rhodesia.2 Instead, 
the two years 1964-65 saw a marked upturn in the economy in place of the 
stagnation which characterised the dying years of Federation.
This period of stagnation can be attributed to the political uncertainties 
of the time, to the adverse movements in the terms of trade which depressed 
mining activity and to the decline in investment and fall in the inflow of foreign 
capital that followed the very high rates of investment in the 1950s and which 
had left the economy with considerable spare capacity.
In the first post-Federal year (1964) the real growth rate improved to 2.9 
percent from one percent in 1963 while in 1965 it was 4 \  percent—the highest 
since 1960. More significant was the reversal in 1965 of the downward trend 
in gross national income per head at constant prices which had taken place 
between 1960 and 1964.
1. Data used in this article is derived from the budget speech, the Economic Surveys 
for 1965 and 1966 and the Quarterly Economic Indicators. The fact that the full 
range of economic indicators is no longer published means that some gaps are 
unavoidable.
2. See particularly “Break-Up” The Phoenix Group, Salisbury, 1963.
44
ECONOMY UNDER SANCTIONS 45
Investment, Employment and Migration:
Fixed capital formation as a ratio of gross domestic product in the money 
economy fell steadily from the high level of 37 percent in 1956 to 13.9 percent 
in 1964, but then improved marginally to 14 percent in 1965. The employment 
of Africans in Rhodesia had reached a peak of 640,000 in 1960, but then 
declined to 606,000 in 1963. 1964 marked the recovery year with a rise to 
616,000 followed by a further increase to 624,000 in 1965. The employment 
pattern for non-Africans was similar falling from its 1960 peak to 86,000 in
1964 but then recovering to 89,100 in 1965.
A useful indicator of prosperity in Rhodesia is the migration of non- 
Africans. The net inflow reached a peak of 13,000 in 1956.1 By 1960 this had 
been whittled away by rising emigration and falling immigration to 1,731. 
Between 1961 and 1964 there was a net loss of 12,656, reflecting the outflow, 
especially of Europeans, that coincided with the dissolution of the Federation.
1965 was the year of recovery with a net gain of 4,469.
Production, Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments:
Between 1961 and 1963 industrial production was virtually stagnant. The 
index of manufacturing production (1964 equals 100) rose 18.4 percent in 
1964 and 1965 to reach a record level of 108.2. The value of mineral output 
fell from a peak of £27.2 million in 1961 to £23.7 million in 1963, recovering 
in the next two years to a record level of just under £32 million in 1965. The 
value of agricultural production increased almost 11 percent in 1965 largely 
due to the expansion of sugar and beef production.
Because inter-territorial trade figures were not kept during the Federal 
period it is not possible to examine Rhodesia’s trade performance in the early 
60s. What can be said though is that it was widely anticipated that Rhodesia 
would face balance of payments difficulties after the Federal dissolution 
because of the expected loss of markets in Zambia and Malawi, because of 
the expected outflow of Europeans and the burden of external debt.
In fact, the visible trade figures showed a substantial surplus of £32.3 
million in 1964 and £44.9 million in 1965. Exports to Zambia and Malawi 
expanded so that in 1965 these two markets accounted for just over 30 percent 
of total domestic exports. Zambia alone was buying 25 percent. On current 
account the balance of payments surplus in 1964 was £1.4 million and a record 
£14 million in 1965. These compare with an officially estimated surplus of £0.8 
million in 1963.
Growth in 1964 and 1965 was largely export generated—the value of
1. These figures are not completely accurate as no record was kept of inter-territorial 
movements during the Federal years.
46 RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
domestic exports increased 20 percent in 1965. It also reflected a rise in fixed 
investment and the beginnings of a long-awaited recovery in the building 
industry. Thus, when voluntary sanctions were imposed at the end of 1965 
the worst effects of Federal dissolution had been overcome and the economy 
was well-placed to withstand new economic pressures. Employment was 
increasing, real living standards were on the rise after a four year decline and 
industrial, mineral and agricultural production were all improving. In addition, 
the external payments position was very sound.
II. Voluntary and Mandatory Sanctions: Decline and Recovery 1966-1967.
Against this background, the imposition of voluntary sanctions resulted 
in a fall in GDP at factor cost of 2.6 percent between 1965 and 1966. This 
is the first such fall since 1931, but nevertheless, a very minor one when the 
economic pressures on the economy are taken into account.
The domestic impact of this fall was mitigated by the reduction in net 
incomes paid abroad. As a result of the fall in these the decline in gross 
national income was only £3.4 million or one percent. Looked at in real 
terms—that is taking account of the rise in prices—the fall in GNI in 1966 
was 3.9 percent but in real terms GNI in 1966 was still 2.6 percent above its 
1964 level. More serious was the fall in real income per head. Its rise between 
1964 and 1965 was followed by a decline in 1966 which took it below its 1964 
level. A mitigating factor, however, was the fact that the share of wages and 
salaries in national income actually increased in 1966 due to the sharp fall 
in profits.
This limited decline in activity occurred in the face of a 36.5 percent fall 
in the value of exports. Direct controls—in the form of import and exchange 
controls—and the combination of fiscal and monetary policy were, therefore, 
most successful in insulating the domestic economy from this sharp con­
traction in foreign earnings. External balance was secured by severe import 
control restricting imports to 70 percent of their 1965 level. The actual 
volume of imports probably fell slightly more because unit prices of imports 
in 1966—other than mineral fuels—were 4 percent higher than in 1965. As a 
result of the import cutback a trade surplus of £18.7 million was achieved 
(1965 £41.8 million) despite the £60.1 million decline in export earnings.
The deficit on invisibles was less than in 1965—£17.2 million against £26.8 
million—partly because of a fall in freight and insurance payable on imports 
and partly due to the blocking of payments to and from Britain and Zambia. 
British and Zambian action reduced private investment income by £4.4 million 
and the interest receipts of Government by £0.7 million. But Rhodesian 
counter-measures reduced the outflow by £8.8 million. As a result there was
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a current account surplus of £1£ million which, with the capital account 
outflow of £1.9 million, gave an overall deficit on current and capital account 
of only £400,000.
Production:
Both agriculture and mining increased their relative as well as their 
absolute contributions to GDP, while, in contrast, there were significant falls 
in distribution and manufacturing. The main increase in percentage terms was 
achieved in public administration, defence, education and health.
Remarkably, agricultural production increased 1.4 percent in value despite 
a fall of £7.4 million in the value of tobacco production. The overall increase 
in the value of agricultural output appears to have been £1.3 million—£0.7 
million of this representing an increase in the value of subsistence production. 
Production for sale by African farmers rose £0.5 million to £4.2 million while 
in the European sector the increase was £100,000. This suggests that some 
element of diversification has already taken place as the £7.4 million fall in 
the value of tobacco production was more than offset by the £8 million rise 
in other agricultural output in the money economy. However, there was a 
once-and-for-all element in the form of sugar production for stockpile and 
the rise in the producer price of beef.
The value of mining output rose 2 percent above its 1965 level to a new 
record of £32.6 million despite the voluntary sanctions that were applied to 
the country’s major mineral exports, and the fact that the volume of produc­
tion fell marginally.
Industrial output fell 9.9 percent with only foodstuffs and electricity 
showing an increase. There were sharp falls in the transport and chemical and 
petrol product categories reflecting the fact that the oil refinery was out of 
production for most of the year and that the motor assembly industry was 
working well below full capacity. However, in the last quarter of 1966 output 
was higher than in the same quarter of 1965 in the clothing and footwear, 
sawmilling, furniture, paints, electrical machinery and miscellaneous food­
stuffs categories, showing the first evidence of a recovery in manufacturing 
output generally.
1967 has provided further evidence of this recovery. In every month up 
to the end of May, the volume of industrial production was higher by an 
average of 5 percent than in the corresponding month of 1966, and this, 
despite the fact that both the major motor assemblers—BMC and Ford— 
had ceased production altogether. An important recovery which largely 
sustained the bui’ding industry in 1966 was the upsurge in private house 
building and the increased spending by the public sector on African housing
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projects. The first five months of 1967 saw a doubling in the value of building 
plans approved in the main centres from their 1966 levels for the same period.
The other main decline in contribution to the GDP in 1966 was in the 
distribution sector. The fall in external trade plus a marginal decline in con­
sumption expenditure reflect the difficulties faced by commerce and shown 
in the sharp decline in commercial employment.
The most significant increase in contribution to domestic product was 
shown by the Public Administration sector, and reflected in the rise of 1,900 
people in government employment, partly as a result of the deliberate policy 
of absorbing workers retrenched in other sectors.
The migration pattern for non-Africans improved in the second half of 
1966 and in 1967. In the first six months of this year there was a net gain of 
1,500 European immigrants compared with a net loss of nearly 1,000 in the 
same period of 1966.
Employment, Earnings and Prices:
Employment of Africans dropped 9,000 (1.4 percent) in 1966 to its 
lowest level since 1963. However, with the net emigration of 16,000 adult 
African males during the year it can be argued that there were more indigenous 
Africans in jobs at the end of the year than in 1965.
There were some noteworthy changes in the pattern of employment. The 
number of Africans employed in agriculture fell 10,300 (3.8 percent) and there 
was also an 8.3 percent fall in African employment in distribution and a 2.5 
percent decline in manufacturing. Moving significantly against this trend 
was the 5.1 percent rise in Africans employed in building and construction. 
Understandably too, given the Government’s employment policy, there was 
a small rise in Africans in Government employment.
The picture for the early months of 1967 is incomplete because employ­
ment figures for agriculture are unavailable. Outside agriculture, by the end 
May, the number of Africans in employment had increased 7,000 since 
December 1966—a rise of 2 per cent.
The number of non-Africans in employment remained unchanged in 
1966 though there was a 9£ percent decline in distribution and a rise of 8.1 
percent in government administration. In 1967—again in industries other 
than agriculture—employment of non-Africans rose 1,000 in the first five 
months of the year.
The average wage of Africans in employment increased 3 percent during 
1966 but this was entirely offset by the 3 percent rise in the African consumer 
price index. Average earnings of non-Africans increased 3 percent against
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a 2 \  percent rise in the European consumer prices index. In the first half of 
1967 the index rose a further 1.6 percent over the December 1966 figure.
The fact that the overall European consumer price index has only risen 
4 percent since December 1965 is puzzling. During this period the rate of 
sales tax was doubled from 4d. to 8d. in the £. There were customs and excise 
duty increases affecting drink and tobacco; sanctions and import controls 
have increased the cost of some imports and, sometimes, led to the substitution 
of more expensive locally-produced articles; petrol and vehicle expenses 
generally have risen sharply as a result of mandatory sanctions on motor 
vehicles and the oil embargo.
This raises a general consideration affecting virtually all of the data used 
in this discusion. In general, there is no conflict between the aggregate economic 
data presented in this study and personal experience but the consumer price 
index is the one important exception to this generalisation. Here, personal 
experience does appear to be at variance with the published information. In 
addition, there are sound technical reasons for questioning the validity of the 
index. After all, it is based on a consumer budget survey carried out as long 
ago as October, 1960. Since then, there have been changes in the pattern of 
expenditure. These include the introduction of television and the imposition 
of school fees, as well as changes in the range, nature and quality of local 
consumer products vis-a-vis imports. One may therefore suspect that the 
published figures to some extent understate the real rise in prices over the 
last 20 months.
Consumption Savings and Investment:
Private consumption expenditure, measured at constant prices, fell 5.8 
percent from 1965 to 1966, and was one percent below its 1964 level. There 
was also a 5.2 percent fall in government current spending in 1966, compared 
with the previous year but much more important was the sharp reduction in 
gross fixed capital formation. At £36.2 million (1964 prices) it was no less 
than 21.6 percent below its 1965 level and 16 percent lower than in 1964.
Offsetting these falls were the sharp rise in stocks which, at 1964 prices, 
increased £24 million compared with an increase of £2.3 million in 1965 and 
£2.8 million the previous year. This reflects the stockpiling of tobacco and 
almost certainly of sugar, as well.
III. The Faflnre of Sanctions
If a single development can be said to highlight the failure of economic 
sanctions, it was the announcement in July that the Rhodesian Government 
was launching an immigration promotion drive. The philosophy of sanctions 
was the creation of economic pressures resulting in heavy unemployment and
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mass emigration so that the white population would force a change of govern­
ment. Instead, the Rhodesian Government in mid-1967 has been able to reveal, 
not only that non-African employment has reached a record level but also 
that it was launching an immigration promotion drive to alleviate the shortage 
of skilled manpower facing the economy. This failure of sanctions can only 
be explained however, against the background of economic developments 
both in Rhodesia and the world in general.
For a start, sanctions have not been applied effectively even by Rhodesia’s 
most determined enemies. The case of Zambia is a classic example. Despite 
that country’s declared policy of boycotting Rhodesian goods Rhodesian 
exports to Zambia are still about half their pre-UDI level. Economic self- 
interest has dictated that a number of loopholes be left in the sanctions 
curtain. In addition to buying Rhodesian products Zambia has been forced to 
rely upon the Rhodesian rail transport system to a great extent, especially 
where imports from South Africa are concerned.
What is true of Zambia is also true to varying degrees of a number of 
other countries. In particular, with buoyant world demand for minerals— 
chrome, asbestos, copper, iron ore,etc.—it has still been possible to sell these 
products though perhaps at a rather reduced price even to countries who 
officially support voluntary or mandatory sanctions. A  related point is the 
difficulty of identifying the origin of certain raw materials—and manufactured 
imports and exports as well. The refusal of South Africa and Portugal to 
co-operate in the sanctions campaign increased the practical difficulties of 
applying sanctions effectively. Their neutrality has made sanctions evasion a 
good deal easier than would otherwise have been the case. Decisions by some 
countries to honour existing contracts provided an additional loophole.
If a single transaction can be said to highlight the difficulties involved 
in applying sanctions the success of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank in printing 
its own banknotes can be used as an example. There is no doubt that the 
British Government went to considerable pains and expense to prevent 
Rhodesia from securing new banknotes and Britain’s eventual failure reflects 
the great difficulty involved in preventing imports of any kind from reaching 
Rhodesia.
Thus the gap between the theory of economic sanctions and their applica­
tion is very wide. The lack of enthusiastic enforcement of sanctions by countries 
interested in trading in the best markets, the inability of some countries to 
apply sanctions effectively and the numerous loopholes that exist on the 
administrative side help to explain the failure of sanctions.
In 1966 Rhodesian exports fell £60.1 million. This is largely a reflection 
of the almost-total loss of the British market—especially for tobacco—and a 
sharp contraction in the Zambian market. Had sanctions been applied effec­
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tively the fall in exports would probably have been at least another £20 million 
which would have put a very different complexion on Rhodesia’s situation.
The oil embargo was never really a serious threat to the viability of the 
Rhodesian economy. It had certain psychological effects—particularly the 
turning back of tankers in the Mo?ambique channel. It has created difficulties 
for the motor trade, for the oil companies, for the pipeline company and also 
forced the closure of the oil refinery. The extra cost of importing fuel by road 
and rail has pushed up prices and production costs in the economy. However, 
the measure of the embargo’s ineffectiveness is that petrol is rationed only 
through the price mechanism. A  consumer can purchase as much fuel as he 
requires provided he is prepared to pay the surcharge of 2s. 8d. per gallon 
for off-ration petrol.
Apart from the difficulty of applying sanctions—and of getting less- 
implicated nations to apply them—is the fact that at the end of 1965 the 
Rhodesian economy was well-placed to withstand economic pressures. The 
years of Federation had seen a great broadening and diversifying of the 
economy. The manner in which the Rhodesian economy rode out the political 
storms of the early 1960s and the economic difficulties of Federal dissolution 
showed just how resilient it had become.
Furthermore the prosperity of 1965 with a 17 percent expansion of exports 
gave the economy reserves- - in  particular stocks of imported commodities on 
which it could draw in times of adversity. The sharp rise in domestic savings 
to a record level of nearly £65 million—almost 18jr percent of GDP—was to 
be an important factor in helping the economy to withstand sanctions in the 
subsequent year.
A related consideration—often forgotten by those who expected the 
economy to suffer greater damage from Federal dissolution and from sanctions 
has been the importance of institutional factors. A number of Rhodesia’s 
customers were simply more accustomed to dealing with Rhodesia than with 
anyone else. It was more convenient as well as economic, for instance, for a 
wide range of Zambian importers, by force of habit if nothing else, to 
continue to buy from Rhodesia unless physically prevented from so doing. 
Direct controls in Zambia have—to an increasing extent—been preventing this 
but the fact that Zambia is still buying imports from Rhodesia suggests that 
there is a limit to the extent to which political considerations can override 
economic self-interest.
There is also the contrast in the approaches of the British and Rhodesian 
Governments. More often than not—especially in the early days of the 
sanctions campaign—the Salisbury officials appeared to be at least one jump 
ahead of their Whitehall counterparts. The delay in imposing sanctions after 
the declaration of Independence certainly made the Rhodesians’ task easier.
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In addition, with relatively few exceptions, the Rhodesians have been much 
nearer the mark in their forecasts and assessments than have the British. 
Whitehall has been made to look incompetent and inaccurate in simple matters 
of fact, such as the level of British imports into Rhodesia during 1966.
Britain’s standing in the dispute has not been enhanced by the dual 
standard adopted over certain of Rhodesia’s external debt obligations. The 
Rhodesian attitude is that the freezing of her sterling reserves in November 
1965 coupled with the steps taken to deprive the country of the means to earn 
the foreign exchange to meet her commitments justified the decision to default 
on London market debt (other than that held by residents of Rhodesia, Malawi 
and South Africa and purchased before December 4th, 1965) debt due to the 
British Government and its agencies and debt under British Government 
guarantee. Britain, on the other hand, while claiming to be the legal Govern­
ment of Rhodesia has at the same time disavowed all responsibility for 
Rhodesian debts. Even more ludicrous has been the British attitude over new 
loans floated internally by the Rhodesian Government. Britain has persistently 
claimed that the “illegal regime” is not capable of incurring legal obligations on 
behalf of the Rhodesian Government. Despite this Britain still holds the same 
illegal regime responsible for existing debt obligations.
The high water mark of British impotence and ineptitude was the claim 
made by Sir Sidney Caine, Governor of Britain’s so-called British Reserve 
Bank of Rhodesia established soon after UDI, that the new bank notes printed 
in Salisbury were not legal tender.
The point must also be made that the blocking and freezing of dividends, 
profits and interest payable to Rhodesians by Britain and Zambia reduced 
Rhodesia’s income by £5.1 million in 1966 while Rhodesia’s retaliatory 
measures reduced the income paid abroad by £8.8 million—leaving a useful 
net gain of £3.7 million.
In sum, disillusionment with the vague threats, warnings, promises and 
incompetence of the British Government has, in fact, been an important 
explanation for the failure of sanctions.
Rhodesian Countermeasures:
Thus far, in explaining the failure of sanctions, the emphasis has been on 
the unwillingness or inability of foreign countries to apply measures against 
Rhodesia. However, the role of Rhodesian counter-measures should not be 
under-estimated.
The policy of stockpiling tobacco and sugar provided some breathing 
space for the agricultural sector to readjust itself to the new situation. This 
stockpiling policy was suitable only for a short-term holding operation. Thus,
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sugar production in 1967 is being reduced to 60 per cent of its 1966 level while 
tobacco output will be little more than half a normal year’s crop. Stockpiling 
financed through judicious monetary policy and without any significant 
increases in taxation has not yet led to any serious inflation. During 1966 
deposit-receiving institutions increased their lending to Government to the tune 
of £34.7 million to total £87.7 million—an increase of 65 percent. This was 
achieved by a sharp rise in personal savings as well as the cutback in bank 
lending to the public.
The 1967-68 budget is openly reflationary with a 9 percent rise in expen­
diture yielding a deficit on revenue account of million to be covered by the 
accumulated surplus. Fiscal policy is being used to stimulate agricultural 
activity with an amount of £1£ million set aside to subsidise the maize price; 
£1J million being provided for the purchase of tobacco quotas and £120,000 
for the wheat subsidy. The increases in both short and long term Government 
borrowing, however, necessitated a rise of £1.3 million (13 percent) in the 
provision for debt servicing.
Overall, fiscal policy is playing a much more positive role in 1967-68 
presumably partly to offset the deflationary forces in the economy sparked off 
by the tobacco cutback, the fall in export earnings and the decline in 
investment.
The role of exchange control in providing increased personal savings for 
public investment has already been mentioned. The build-up of domestic 
funds and the shortage of investment opportunities generated an upswing in 
domestic home building which was a major factor making for recovery in 
the building industry.
Manpower controls were used as part of the holding operation to prevent 
skilled labour from being retrenched and forced to leave the country. In 
addition, the mobility of white labour between Rhodesia and South Africa 
and of African labour between jobs in the towns and either the reserves 
or the neighbouring territories moderated the unemployment problem.
The final economic argument relates to the stimulus from import sub­
stitution and agricultural diversification. It is a well-known fact that a number 
of countries have enjoyed outbursts of industrial growth as a result of adversity. 
The impact of sanctions on secondary industry has been a small decline in 
domestic consumer demand and a severe curtailment of exports, coupled with 
a substantial restriction in supplies opening the door to industrial expansion 
by way of import substitution. To a limited extent too, a number of exporters 
have been able to substitute a new foothold in the South African market for 
lost markets in Zambia.
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Last, but certainly not least in assessing the failure of sanctions is the 
political aspect. The fact is that external pressure far from splitting the white 
electorate has tended to solidify political opinion.
IV. The Short Term Prospect.
Looking ahead, the short term prospect is that with sanctions having 
apparently passed their peak effectiveness an overall improvement in the level 
of economic activity can be expected. The most recently published indicators 
suggest that the recovery has already started. Employment outside agriculture 
is higher; industrial output has increased while building activity, retail and 
wholesale sales and migration have all improved over 1966. The Minister of 
Finance has estimated that GNP in 1967 will be higher than 1966 and may 
possibly exceed the 1965 figure.
Exports
Four points are quite crucial in any assessment of the economy’s short 
term prospects. The first is the level of exports. It has been revealed that this 
year it has been possible to sustain a level of imports 20 percent above that of 
the first six months of last year. This suggests some improvement in export 
earnings in 1967—even despite the imposition of mandatory sanctions—so 
that total exports this year may be nearer £115 to £120 million than last year’s 
£104.6 million.
The level of exports in 1968 seems likely to be a more important deter­
minant of the level of economic activity than it was in 1966 because of the 
cutbacks in tobacco and sugar production. The extent to which economic 
activity was artificially maintained by stockpiling in 1966 and 1967 should not 
be forgotten. Thus, in the absence of further international steps to increase the 
effectiveness of sanctions it would seem probable that rising exports will play 
a prominent role in generating an upswing in the economy.
A related consideration is the level of capital goods imports. The domestic 
effect of import control on consumer goods has been offset to an important 
degree by import substitution production by Rhodesian industry. In 1966 
consumer-good imports accounted for only 12 percent of the total against 
18 per cent the previous year. Imports of capital goods and raw materials 
took the greater strain imposed by import control falling 24 percent from 
about £98 million to £74 million. This decline is reflected in the fall in capital 
formation. To make matters worse the capital account of the balance of 
payments showed an outflow of £1.9 million in 1966 against an inflow of 
£4.4 million in 1965. It is therefore essential to increase the level of export 
earnings so that the economy can afford a higher level of imports of capital 
equipment and raw materials.
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Tobacco:
Second consideration is the impact of the 34 percent tobacco cutback. The 
table summarises the position in the tobacco industry since 1965.
Year of Crop Weight Average Price Total income to Growers
Sales lb. million pence per lb. £ million
1965 246 32.96 £33.8 m.
1966 260 24.0 £26.0 m.
1967 200 28.0 £23.3 m.
1968 132 28.0 £15.4 m.
In the short space of three years total income to growers will have been 
reduced by almost 55 percent. At the time of writing it is not possible to say 
how many growers will have withdrawn from the crop altogether but it seems 
that the number of tobacco farmers will have fallen by about 20 percent. The 
impact on employment should not be forgotten. Diversification from tobacco 
into other crops will almost certainly mean a reduction in employment in the 
agricultural sector largely because tobacco is a more labour intensive crop 
than the suggested substitutes. Cotton, which would appear to be the most 
promising alternative to tobacco, requires about four times as much land to 
produce the same value of output and is much less labour intensive.
The decline in agricultural production because of the tobacco cutback in 
1967-68 is unlikely to be offset in 1968 by increases in activities other than 
tobacco—even despite the higher level of investment that might be expected 
to flow from the Government’s provision of funds for the industry. The 
deflationary forces set in motion by the cutback will begin to have their effect 
towards the end of 1967 with the reduction in purchases by tobacco growers 
and a reduction in agricultural employment. The real impact of the cutback will 
only be felt in 1968 when the primary effect of the reduced agricultural pro­
duction will be intensified by the industrial and commercial implications of 
the fall in activity in the tobacco processing and packing industry.
The favourable effects of the tobacco cutback should not be overlooked. 
First and foremost is the fact that the stockpile at the end of this year has been 
estimated at 210 million lbs. which clearly involves a wasteful use of financial 
resources to the tune of more than £20 million tied up in maintaining the 
stockpile. The production cutback should also have beneficial balance of 
payments effects because it is estimated that some 20 percent of the inputs 
into tobacco production represent imports.
Obviously, the pattern and success or otherwise of diversification that 
flows from the cutback will be quite crucial. If it involves the high cost 
production of import substitutes (e.g. wheat) or surplus output of maize, which
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is subsidised anyway, it will be much less beneficial than if it involves the 
economic production of crops for use by domestic industry or for export.
Investment: In 1966, gross fixed capital formation amounted to just under 
12 per cent of GDP in the money economy—the lowest such percentage 
recorded since 1954. This compares with 14 percent in 1965 and 13.9 percent in 
1964, and is only one third of the 36.2 percent achieved in 1957 and again in 
1958. At constant prices investment was 21.6 percent below its 1965 level and 
16 percent below its 1964 total.
A by no means insignificant element of this capital formation took the 
form of new house-building. This type of investment while it creates necessary 
facilities for the economy does not create the same extra productive capacity 
as an investment in new plant and equipment. Thus not only does the total fall 
in capital investment give rise to anxiety but also the fact that investment in 
agriculture fell nearly 58 percent (the completion of lowveld investment projects 
was a major factor here) while that in manufacturing declined 27£ percent.
The effect of this downturn in investment in 1966 must be making itself 
felt in 1967 and slowing the rate of economic growth. However, the short term 
prospect for 1967 is rather better and gross fixed capital investment this year 
may improve on the 1964 figure.
Inflation: The tobacco cutback plus the cumulative effect of the 1966 
reduction in investment would seem likely to create certain deflationary pres­
sures in late 1967 and 1968. Against this a reflationary budget with increased 
recurrent and loan expenditure plus the rise in pension payments and small 
tax concessions has been introduced to maintain a high level of domestic 
activity. This reflationary boost seems likely to ensure that the economic 
upswing already in progress will more than offset any deflationary tendencies. 
However, there is the danger of inflation arising from both demand-pull and 
cost-push elements.
The demand-pull element takes the form of the pressure on limited 
supplies of imports—even despite the recent announcement of an increase in 
imports. The cost-push element arises from the point mentioned above that the 
consumer price index probably under-states the real rise in the cost of living, 
which itself can be related largely to the effects of import control. In his budget 
speech the Minister of Finance with this problem in mind urged employees 
not to press wage claims. It is just possible, however, that some form of wage 
freeze policy might later become necessary.
Two other elements making for inflation are the sharp rise in Government 
short term borrowing plus the margin of under-employment on Rhodesia 
Railways that has followed the repatriation of railwaymen from Zambia.
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All in all, the short term outlook is relatively satisfactory. There is no 
reason to doubt the estimate that GNP will increase in 1967 and may even 
reach its 1965 level (at current rather than at constant prices) but unless 
there is a very rapid crumbling away of sanctions it would probably be wise to 
expect a slower rate of growth in 1968.
V. The Long Term Prospect
The long term prospect is less satisfactory. This is almost entirely due to 
the implications of the rate of growth of the African population—34 per 1,000 
or almost percent.
The compound growth rate of population in the world as a whole is put 
at 1.7 percent per annum in a recent United Nations publication.1 The rate for 
Africa is estimated at 2.1 percent a year. The Rhodesian rate is not only twice 
the world average but also well above the average rate for the African 
continent.
With high fertility the age pyramid in Rhodesia has a wide base but tapers 
off rapidly. Hence some 46.6 percent of the African population is under the 
age of 15. This involves a proportionately larger investment in human capital. 
The high proportion under the age of 15 means a heavy dependency load on 
the economy and fast rising expenditure on social services—especially health 
and education.* 2 Children under the age of 15 are not significant producers— 
but only consumers. To a certain extent, of course, this dependency load is 
reduced by the high participation of young persons in subsistence cultivation 
but this is scarcely a desirable situation.
Aside from these issues two considerations are of vital significance. The 
first is the fact that such a high rate of population growth demands a rapid rate 
of increase in GNP each year if living standards are to improve materially. 
Secondly, it is necessary to create some 30,000 plus new jobs—in the money and 
subsistence economies combined-each year in order to provide sufficient 
employment opportunities.
Since 1954— even with the very rapid growth of GNI in the fifties—income 
per head at constant prices has only increased 5.2 percent, from £57.0 in 1954 
to £60 in 1966. The pattern in the 1960s has been very unsatisfactory. Only 
in 1965 did real income per head (constant prices) improve. The largest fall 
was in 1966 when the decline was 7.0 percent.3
/. V.N. Economic Bulletin for Africa, January, 1965.
2. See Pages 13 to 24 above "The Economics of African Education.”
3. It should be stressed that undue reliance should not be placed on year to year 
changes. The Central Statistical Office warns that the per capita figures are only 
approximate and are at best an indication of long term trends.
58 RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
On the employment side the position is little better. The total number of 
Africans in employment at the end of 1966 was 5,000 less than in 1957, although 
over this period the estimated African population increased by more than 
one million. Net emigration of Africans—50,370 since 1957—has eased the 
situation, though only marginally.
Some idea of the magnitude of the problem can be gleaned from the fact 
that even in the middle fifties when investment was at a high level and output 
increasing at a rapid rate, the maximum increase in African employment 
achieved in any one year was 28,000 between 1955 and 1956. In those two 
years investment was of the order of 36 percent of GDP.
If one assumes an incremental capital-output ratio for Rhodesia of the 
order of 3:1 (which is probably too narrow) and a desired rate of economic 
growth of 6 per cent per annum this would mean a desired rate of net 
investment of no less than 18 percent of GDP. If one further assumes a 
depreciation rate of (say) 4 percent, this would then mean that in order to 
obtain a growth rate of 6 percent, and thereby secure some real improvement 
in living standards, at least 22 percent of GDP would need to be invested each 
year. In 1966 this would have meant almost doubling gross fixed capital 
formation. It can be argued that Rhodesia has only managed a sufficiently 
high level of investment when there has been a substantial capital inflow. 
The prospects for this are not good under existing circumstances.
The present low level of investment and high rate of population growth 
means that one must expect a rise in urban unemployment coupled with 
deepening rural poverty in the subsistence sector. In some areas a critical 
position must soon be reached—if it has not been reached already—whereby 
the ratio of labour to land in the subsistence economy is such as to severely 
inhibit the possibilities of achieving increases in productivity and output per 
head.
One other long term problem merits brief mention. It can be argued that 
by becoming less dependent on tobacco the agricultural industry will be more 
soundly based in the future. Against this, it can be argued that in relation to 
the level of inputs into agriculture farmers income will be stabilised at a 
somewhat lower level2 than hitherto even if the diversification programme goes 
ahead smoothly and efficiently which is open to some doubt. More important is 
that barring some sort of political settlement in the next 18 months or so there 
will never be a return to normality for the tobacco industry. The grave danger 
is that world demand over the next two or three years will be met from U.S. 
stocks thereby giving other country-producers the time to step up their 
outputs.
2. See speech by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. G. W. Rudland, August 1st, 1967. 
Hansard Vol. 68, No. 6, Col. 374. "It is true that in ordinary circumstances there 
is no other crop which can adequately replace tobacco in the farming economy . . .”
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VI. Conclusions: The Cost of Sanctions
Estimating the cost of sanctions to the Rhodesian economy involves 
measuring what has been achieved and maintained against what might have 
been achieved in the absence of sanctions. It is therefore a thoroughly 
speculative exercise whose results depend upon the assumptions made about 
what might have happened had Rhodesia continued along the 1964-65 path of 
negotiations with the British Government.
It is more meaningful to conclude that in the light of the extraordinary 
pressures applied the short term position of the economy is surprisingly good 
and extremely satisfactory. It can be said that the brunt of sanctions so far 
has been borne by commerce and industry, by profits which declined 18.7 
percent in 1966 and by the African wage-earner because of the fall in African 
employment and because the increase in average earnings only just kept pace 
with rising prices. It can be said, too, that the terms of trade have been turned 
against Rhodesia as a result of political pressures. It can also be said that the 
prospect for 1967 is one of rising economic activity and national income, though 
in 1968—unless there are major breakthroughs of the sanctions wall—the rate 
of growth is unlikely to be as good.
The long term implications are more difficult to assess. Clearly the 
employment and real income per head problems thrown up by the rapid 
population growth would have existed anyway regardless of sanctions. What has 
to be assessed is the extent to which the growth forgone in 1966 and 1967 has 
accentuated the problem. This cannot be measured in economic terms alone 
but must be seen in the political context of the benefits of greater control over 
one’s own destinies.
Looking ahead, the short term priorities are obvious. The need is to main­
tain a high level of economic activity while at the same time ensuring relative 
price stability and securing the external payments position.
The long term priorities would seem to have two facets. First the need 
to achieve a growth rate of the order of at least 6 percent per annum. Second 
the need to ensure a more even spread in the distribution of the gains from 
growth. In other words ensuring that the African population—especially those 
in the tribal areas—share to an increasing extent the benefits of growth.
The ways in which these objectives can be achieved fall outside this 
discussion. Two relevant points should be stressed. First, if economic resources 
of given value are devoted to retarding population growth rather than 
accelerating production growth, these resources could be 100 or so times more 
effective in raising per capita incomes.1 This is because, while population may 
double in a little over 20 years, natural resources cannot so increase by
1. S. Enke. “The Economic Aspects of Slowing Population Growth”. The Economic 
Journal, March, 1966, pp. 44-56.
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definition. At the same time, while it may be possible to increase employment 
opportunities rapidly enough—though this is highly improbable—very few 
developing countries are able to save and invest enough each year to double 
their capital stock over 20 years. Thus family planning and population control 
must be in the forefront of any drive to achieve better living standards in 
Rhodesia.
The second point relates to the definition of economic development. It 
is normally assumed that development is taking place when relative income 
per capita is increasing. In a dual economy this could be achieved if real 
income grew in the money sector only so that the impact on the majority of 
indigenous inhabitants was negligible. This consideration is relevant to the 
Rhodesian situation. It is quite clear that the non-African community has 
enioyed a sustained rise in real income and in the level of employment since 
1954. Yet, because of falls in the 1960s real income per capita in 1966 was 
little different from its 1954 level. Thus the African community has failed to 
share the fruits of growth to the same extent. Job creation in the money 
economy has not kept pace with population growth. The absolute gap between 
average African and average non-African wage earnings has widened sub­
stantially from £819 in 1954 to £1,199 in 1966. Income per head in the sub­
sistence sector has remained stagnant over the period at about £12 so that the 
inhabitant of the subsistence economy has failed to share the gains from 
economic development. At the same time the proportion of the total population 
in the subsistence sector has increased substantially.
Therefore, it is essential to do more not only to create job opportunities 
for the fast growing population but also to ensure that real income per head 
in the subsistence economy expands so that the majority of the population 
shares to an increasing extent in the gains from economic growth.
Department of Economics,
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